Battle of Beersheba
- Sinai - Palestine campaign - World War I - Lieutenant General Henry Chauvel - Desert Mounted Corps -
|
|
The Battle of Beersheba took place on 31 October 1917, as part of the Sinai and Palestine campaign during World War I. The highlight of the battle was the now famous charge of the Australian 4th Light Horse Brigade, which covered some six kilometres to overrun and capture the last remaining Turkish trenches, and secure the surviving wells at Beersheba.
Prelude
The battle of
Beersheba was one critical element of a wider British offensive,
known as the Third Battle of Gaza, aimed at breaking the Turkish
defensive line that stretched from Gaza on the Mediterranean
shore to Beersheba, an important regional centre some 50
kilometres inland.
Earlier in 1917, two previous attempts to breach this line had
failed. After the Second Battle of Gaza ended in complete
failure, General Archibald Murray, the commander in chief of the
British forces in Egypt and Palestine, was replaced by the
distinguished cavalry commander, General Edmund Allenby,
formerly the commander of the British Third Army on the Western
Front.
The Allied Forces
Allenby's demanded and received large reinforcements before renewing the offensive. The "Eastern Force" headquarters was replaced by two infantry corps headquarters; the XX Corps, commanded by General Philip Chetwode, and the XXI Corps commanded by Lieutenant General Edward Bulfin. More significantly, with the formation of the British Yeomanry Mounted Division, Allenby possessed three mounted divisions. The two Australian-based divisions were combined to create the new Desert Mounted Corps, commanded by the newly promoted Lieutenant General Henry Chauvel, the first Australian general to command an army corps.
The Turkish Forces
According to Major General Hüseyin Hüsnü
Emir (Erkilet)[1] the Turkish forces at Beersheba under the
command of Ismet Bey consisted of:
The western front: 900 rifles mainly from the 81st Infantry
Regiment;
The southwest front: 1400 rifles mainly from the 67th Infantry
Regiment;
The southern front: 900 rifles mainly from the 48th Infantry
Regiment;
The General Reserve which included 1200 rifles from the 3rd
Cavalry Division.
In total, 4400 Rifles, 60 Machine Guns, and 28 field guns
were available for the defence of Beersheba.
The defences were strong to the south and west (towards Gaza) but to the east depended heavily on a recently fortified redoubt at Tel el Saba, 5 kilometres (3.1 mi) east of Beersheba.
The plan
Beersheba, 1917
The British plan to break the Gaza-Beersheba line had been formulated by General Chetwode following the failure of the two frontal assaults against Gaza. The Turkish defences were formidable in the vicinity of Gaza, but to the east there was a wide gap between the last redoubt and the Beersheba fortifications. The Turks trusted that the lack of reliable water in this region, other than at the wells in Beersheba, would limit British operations to mounted raids.
Chetwode believed that the lack of water would be easier to overcome than the Gaza fortifications. A mammoth engineering and supply effort was undertaken to establish a forward base in the vicinity of Beersheba, from which infantry and mounted troops could stage an assault. The plan depended on the town and water supply being captured swiftly. If the attack was repulsed on the first day, the British would be forced to retire in search of water.
When Allenby took command, he set about
implementing Chetwode's plan. The attack was to be made by two
infantry divisions of the XX Corps (60th (London) Division and
the 74th (Yeomanry) Division) and two mounted divisions of the
Desert Mounted Corps (the Anzac Mounted Division, consisting of
the Australian 1st Light Horse Brigade and 2nd Light Horse
Brigade and the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade, and the
Australian Mounted Division, composed of the Australian 3rd
Light Horse Brigade and 4th Light Horse Brigade and the British
5th Mounted Brigade. Directly under the Desert Mounted Corps HQ
were the British 7th Mounted Brigade and the Imperial Camel
Corps.
The infantry, supported by heavy artillery, would attack from
the southwest against the strongest Beersheba defences, while
the mounted brigades would circle to the south and east. Once
the outlying defences were overcome, it was intended to make a
dismounted attack against Beersheba itself.
The Turks had ascertained where the likely attacks were to come from. In a telegram despatched on 16 August 1917 to the commander of the Ottoman Fourth Army, the intentions of the Allied forces had been clearly detailed by the intelligence analysts. The only thing they were missing was the actual date. They soon gained a reasonable idea of the timetable when the rail line terminated at Karm, a settlement between Gaza and Beersheba, on 25 October 1917.
The opening battle – Battle of El Buggar Ridge
The occupation of Karm was vital for two aspects of the upcoming battle. The long term purpose was to create a major point of supply and water for the Allied troops in the immediate area. The placement of the station at Karm gave a clear, although at the time, misleading signal to the Turks that their bases at Abu Hareira and Tel el Sheria were under threat of immediate attack. Between these two bases was a massive layer of trenches and redoubts known as the Rushdie System which formed a powerful bulwark against any Allied action. Karm Station pointed right to the heart of this system.
The Allied forces converted a
line of observation outposts into fortified redoubts to protect this major
supply depot from attack. The one thing that worried Chauvel was the possibility
that Ottoman artillery could be moved from the Turkish base at Abu Hareira in
the hills and down to el Imara on the plains from where they could pour
devastating fire with high explosive shells upon the rail line and stations. On
27 October 1917, the Turkish 3rd Cavalry Division, supported by the 16th
Infantry Division, mounted a reconnaissance in force at a line encompassing El
Buggar, Hill 720 and Hill 630, to test the resolve of the Allies.[2] The
resulting battle was notable for the heroic resistance of the London Yeomanry at
Hill 720, where two troops from the 1/1st County of London Yeomanry under the
command of Major Alexander Malins Lafone fought to the last man. Lafone won a
posthumous Victoria Cross for this action. Later that day, the Australian 9th
Light Horse Regiment, supported by elements of the British 74th (Yeomanry)
Division on the right and 53rd Division on the left, slowly won back any ground
that was lost. This convinced the Turks that an attack on Beersheba would come
very soon.
Nevertheless, Allenby based his plan on surprise far more than on mere
superiority in numbers to gain success and the action at El Buqqar was
sufficient to keep the Turks guessing as to the true intentions. Allenby
despatched some 40,000 men to tackle Beersheba held by 4,400 men giving a
superiority ratio of almost 10:1 which were good odds upon which to secure a
comfortable victory.
The infantry attack
The attack on Beersheba by Chetwode's XX Corps commenced at 5.55am on 31 October when the artillery, more than 100 field guns and howitzers, commenced bombarding the Turkish trenches. Twenty of the heavy guns were engaged in counter-battery work against the enemy artillery, which was operated by Austrian gunners.
The first infantry went in at 8.30am to capture some Turkish outposts. The main attack of four infantry brigades began at 12.15pm. They quickly reached all their initial objectives and so were in position for the main assault on the township to coincide with the light horse and New Zealanders. It was at this point that the infantry commanders saw that the way to Beersheba was clear and asked for permission to carry the attack through to the town. Allenby refused permission and ordered the infantry to remain in their current positions, as the task had been specifically assigned to the Desert Mounted Corps. The first opportunity to take Beersheba within the next hour was lost.
When the Turks realised that the British infantry had halted, they began to regroup and strengthen their defensive line within a smaller perimeter. Prior to the fall of the southern trenches, the trench system supporting Tel el Saba to the south east of Beersheba was empty. Now it was filled with about 300 veterans, exactly in the line of the projected charge.
The charge of the 4th Light Horse Brigade
The problem for Chauvel was acute. The attack on Tel el Saba
had stalled, as 300 Turkish infantry dug in at the summit
held up the attack. The German commander Kress von
Kressenstein summarised the situation as: "The under
strength Turkish battalion entrusted with its defence
doggedly held out with great courage and in so doing
fulfilled its obligation. They held up two English (sic)
cavalry divisions for six hours and had prevented them from
expanding their outflanking manoeuvres around the
Beersheba-Hebron road."
Chauvel had planned to use the British Yeomanry for a charge
with swords at Beersheba. After Tel el Saba had finally been
secured, Chauvel dithered for about half an hour,
contemplating a retreat with the intention of finishing the
battle the following day. He sent his thoughts to Allenby,
who about half an hour later responded with a furious order
that Chauvel was to take Beersheba that very day.
In the meantime, reports began filtering in that the Turks
were abandoning Beersheba in accordance with the Turkish
plan of defence. The Turkish withdrawal began in an orderly
manner with the cavalry and artillery withdrawing to the
safety of the hills to cover the infantry withdrawal.
Chauvel realised that he was in danger of capturing
Beersheba without the considerable Turkish defensive forces
stationed in the town. He decided to take action. The
Yeomanry could not be used immediately as they were too
dispersed, and with time running out, he famously stated:
"Put Grant straight at it."
The Australian 4th Light Horse Brigade, commanded by
Brigadier William Grant, contained the 4th (Victorian), 11th
(Queensland and South Australia) and 12th (New South Wales)
Light Horse Regiments. The 11th was dispersed but the 4th
and 12th were quickly ready to make the charge. Although
Grant commanded the Brigade, the charge on Beersheba was led
by Lieutenant Colonel Murray William James Bourchier. The
plan for the attack was devised by Lieutenant Colonel Donald
Cameron who later described the circumstances in a letter to
Dr C.E.W. Bean in 1928: "It was clear to me that the
job had to be done before dark, so I advised galloping the
place as our only chance. I had some experience of
successful mounted surprise attacks on the Boer camps in the
South African war."
The men lined up in three consecutive squadrons, the first
two, "A" then "B" Squadrons assembling in line of troop
while the last squadrons, "C" Squadron assembled in line of
column. A hand drawn map was made, created by Lieutenant F.R.
Massie, Adjutant of the 12th Light Horse Regiment, which
illustrated the lines prior to the famous charge.
The regiments
commenced the charge at 4.30 pm, the 12th on the left
and the 4th on the right. They advanced by squadrons
(i.e., three waves) with about 500 yards between
squadrons. They were armed with bayonets in hand; their
rifles were slung over their shoulders. The Australian
11th Light Horse Regiment and the British 5th Mounted
Brigade followed more slowly to the rear, and the
British 7th Mounted Brigade, which was attached to the
Desert Mounted Corps headquarters, also approached from
the south.
The Turkish artillery opened fire with shrapnel from
long range but it was ineffective against the widely
spaced horsemen. Turkish machine guns that opened fire
from the left (which might have inflicted heavy
casualties) were quickly silenced by a battery of horse
artillery. When the line of horsemen got within range of
the Turkish riflemen in the trenches, they started to
take casualties but the defenders failed to allow for
the speed of their approach so once they were within
half a mile of the trenches, the defenders' bullets
started passing overhead as they found it difficult to
alter the sights on rifles quickly enough when
confronted with rapidly moving horsemen. This kept the
numbers of casualties low for the charging Light
Horsemen.
The light horsemen jumped the front trenches and
dismounted behind the line where they turned and engaged
the Turks with bayonets. The Turks were in many cases so
demoralised that they quickly surrendered. One
Australian, who was dazed after having his horse shot
from under him, recovered to find his five attackers
with their hands up, waiting to be taken prisoner.
The later waves of horsemen continued through the town
which the Turks were abandoning in a panic. The charge
was finally halted on the far (northwest) side of
Beersheba where the light horsemen encountered more
Turkish defences. Isolated resistance in the town
continued for a little while but by nightfall, the
remainder of the garrison had been captured. The Turks
had attempted to set fire to some buildings and blow up
the railway, but the majority of the wells (15 out of
17) were captured intact. Also, a heavy rainfall left
temporary pools of water on the ground, allowing the
horses to drink.
The charge of the 4th Light Horse Brigade re-enacted
on its 90th anniversary
In a later report, Bourchier summed up the effect of the attack:
In commenting on the attack I consider that the success was due to the rapidity with which the movement was carried out. Owing to the volume of fire brought to bear from the enemy's position by Machine Guns and rifles, a dismounted attack would have resulted in a much greater number of casualties. It was noticed also that the morale of the enemy was greatly shaken through our troops galloping over his positions thereby causing his riflemen and machine gunners to lose all control of fire discipline. When the troops came within short range of the trenches the enemy seemed to direct almost all his fire at the horses.
He also noted that "this method of attack would not have been practicable were it not for the absence of barbed wire and entanglements."
After the capture of Beersheba, Allenby's order directing Chauvel to take the town by night fall arrived. The action of the 4th Light Horse Brigade had saved the opening offensive of the Third Battle of Gaza and with it, Chauvel's reputation.
Aftermath
In the capture of Beersheba, the 4th Light Horse Brigade took 38 officers and 700 other ranks prisoner, and captured four field guns. In the two regiments, only 31 men were killed (including two officers) and only 36 men wounded (including eight officers). The total losses incurred by the Desert Mounted Corps was 53 men killed and 144 wounded. The heaviest Allied losses were suffered by the British infantry of XX Corps, which lost lost 116 killed in action, although the total number of men killed during the battle from the British force was far greater, totalling 171 men.