1917 - Battle of Passchendaele

 - World War I - Ypres, West Flanders - Belgium - Germany - France - Field-Marshal Douglas Haig - General Erich Ludendorff - Messines Ridge - Pilckem Ridge -  Langemarck, Menin Road - Polygon Wood - Poelcappelle -

From Wikipedia,

The 1917 Battle of Passchendaele, also known as the Third Battle of Ypres or simply Third Ypres, was one of the major battles of World War I, in which British, ANZAC, Canadian and South African units engaged the Imperial German Army.  The battle was fought for control of the village of Passchendaele (Passendale in modern Dutch spelling, now part of the community of Zonnebeke) near the town of Ypres (Ieper in Dutch) in West Flanders, Belgium. The plan was to drive a hole in the German lines, advance to the Belgian coast and capture the German submarine bases there. It was intended to create a decisive corridor in a crucial area of the front, and to take pressure off the French forces. After the Nivelle Offensive the French Army was suffering from extremely low morale, resulting in mutinies and misconduct on a scale that threatened the field-worthiness of entire divisions.

Although the period of the battle saw spells of good weather lasting long enough to dry out the land, Passchendaele has become synonymous with the misery of fighting in thick mud. Most of the battle took place on largely reclaimed marshland, swampy even without rain. The extremely heavy preparatory bombardment by the British tore up the surface of the land, and heavy rain from August onwards produced an impassable terrain of deep "liquid mud", in which an unknown number of soldiers drowned. Even the newly-developed tanks bogged down.

The Germans were well-entrenched, with mutually-supporting pillboxes which the initial bombardment had not destroyed. After three months of fierce fighting the Canadian Corps took Passchendaele on 6 November 1917, ending the battle, but in the meantime the Allied Powers had sustained almost half a million casualties and the Germans just over a quarter of a million. The Allies had captured a mere five miles (8 km) of new front at a cost of 140,000 lives, a ratio of roughly 2 inches, or about 5 cm, gained per dead soldier.

Compounding this staggeringly Pyrrhic figure was the fact that the area was not even considered particularly valuable from a strategic standpoint; in March 1918 — a mere 4 months later — the Allies abandoned to the Germans every inch of territory gained at such cost at Passchendaele in order to free several divisions to cover more strategically valuable terrain during the German Lys Offensive towards Ypres.

Passchendaele was the last gasp of the "one more push" philosophy which posited that the stalemate of attritional trench warfare could be broken by brute offensive action against fixed positions. The enormous and tactically meaningless casualty levels — coupled with the horrendous conditions in which the battle was fought — damaged Field-Marshal Haig's reputation and made it emblematic of the horror of industrialised attrition warfare.

Tactical overview and preliminary battles

By this stage of the war, the commanders-in-chief — Field-Marshal Douglas Haig (British Empire); General Erich Ludendorff (German Empire); and General Philippe Pétain (France) — regarded the Western Front as a single continuous battle which had started with the Battle of the Somme in July 1916. Thus, no sooner had hostilities ended in one sector than a fresh offensive started in another. The Allied objective was to keep Imperial Germany, who were also fighting the war on the Eastern Front, under constant pressure. Since the Somme, tactics and countertactics had significantly developed on both sides of the line.

The Ypres salient had also emerged as one of the more critical points along the Western front. As the last Belgian city out of German hands, it had become an important political symbol; while for the Germans, Ypres was the first road nexus south of the flooded Yser river and its capture would be necessary if the Channel ports were ever to be captured. 1st and 2nd Ypres in 1914 and 1915 had been major German offensives that created the salient, but now it was in Haig's mind to drive the Germans away.

The high ridge to the east and south of Ypres had been lost to the Germans in the First Battle of Ypres, creating the allied salient sticking out into the German positions and overlooked by German artillery on higher ground. On the ridge, the Germans had firm footing to rapidly shift artillery, while the heavy clay soils in the low ground around the city could turn into thick mud with very little encouragement. Also, possession of the ridge afforded very good visibility for a considerable distance.

Haig decided to expand the salient and capture the high ground. He even entertained hopes of breaking through the front and capture the German submarine bases on the Belgian coast. A successful action would not only lessen the U-boat threat in the Channel, but could shorten the allied lines and potentially trap a number of German troops behind the new lines. Haig gave General Sir Hubert Gough command of the battle. This is widely regarded as a mistake, as Gough had neither the experience nor the temperament for the task ahead.

The buildup of Allied troops in the sector had alerted the Germans to the possibility of an imminent offensive. In response, General Ludendorff sent his strategist, Colonel von Lossberg, to the salient as chief of staff of the German Fourth army who were holding the line. Lossberg moved the German Army out of the trenches into a strong defensive line of pillboxes, designed to resist even very heavy artillery and to provide enfilading fire.

Messines Ridge

In order to take the salient, British engineers had been digging under the Messines Ridge and planting a series of nineteen enormous explosive mines (which were nicknamed "D-Dubs"). This work did not go unnoticed, and the German forces dug a series of counter-mines in order to block their work. The German efforts were unsuccessful, and the mines were in place by early June. In late May the allies started bombarding the German lines, "softening up" the defenses. Early in the morning of 7 June at 2:50 AM, the shelling ceased, a signal that an infantry assault would begin in moments. The German infantry that had been sheltering in bunkers made ready for an attack, while their shift-change moved up from the rear to relieve them.

Instead of an assault, the mines were exploded right under the newly occupied trenchlines. The mines killed approximately 10,000 German troops.  Assaults followed shortly thereafter, and were able to capture the trenches with almost no opposition. German counterattacks on the next two nights were completely ineffectual. The plan was a complete success.

Haig ordered General Plumer, the Second Army commander, to continue the battle, but was persuaded to delay further attacks until preparations could be made and the strategic Messines Ridge could be consolidated. Of course, the paradigm for World War One had always meant that it was easier for a defender to reinforce than it was for attackers to exploit a success — a defender can fall back towards intact roads and rail lines, while the attacker must build new ones into the devastated zone in order to bring up his guns and more supplies. As happened again and again in 1917, successes on the scale of the capture of Messines Ridge simply could not be exploited.

July - August 1917

As a second stage of the action, General Sir Hubert Gough was put in charge of the attacks to secure the Gheluvelt Plateau which overlooked Ypres. Many field guns were moved into the area and started a four-day bombardment, but the Germans recognized the sign of an impending offensive, and moved more troops in to reinforce the defences.
In July the Germans used mustard gas for the first time. It attacked sensitive parts of the body, caused blistering, damage to the lungs and inflammation of the eyes, causing blindness (sometimes temporary) and great pain.
One problem in carrying the offensive forward was the Yser Canal, but this was taken on 27 July when the Allies found the German trenches empty.

Battle of Pilckem Ridge

31 July - Four days later, the main offensive opened with a major assault at Pilckem ridge, when the Allies gained about 2,000 yards (1,800 m). The Allies suffered about thirty-two thousand casualties — killed, wounded or missing — in this one action. This was another example of the new 'bite-and-hold' tactics that were proving successful in clearing German defences. German casualties were also substantial, not least because Allied artillery had learned to anticipate the usual German counterattack and were ready for it.

Battle of Langemarck

16 - 18 August - Ground conditions during the whole Ypres-Passchendaele action were bad because the ground was already fought-over and partially flooded. Continuous shelling destroyed drainage canals in the area, and unseasonable heavy rain turned the whole area into a sea of mud and water-filled shell-craters. The troops walked up to the front over paths made of duckboards laid across the mud, often carrying up to one hundred pounds (45 kg) of equipment. It was possible for them to slip off the path into the craters and drown before they could be rescued. The trees were reduced to blunted trunks, the branches and leaves torn away, and the bodies of men buried after previous actions were often uncovered by the rain or later shelling.

September 1917

The strategy known as "bite and hold" favoured by Plumer was adopted for the actions of September and October, after the bad weather in August had contributed to the failures of earlier large-scale attacks. The idea was to make small gains which could be held against counterattack. Sir Herbert Plumer replaced Hubert Gough in command of the offensive.

Battle of Menin Road

20 - 25 September - By now, 1,295 guns were concentrated in the area, approximately one for every five yards of attack front. On 20 September at the battle of Menin Road, after a massive bombardment, the Allies attacked and managed to hold their objective of about 1,500 yards (1,400 m) gained, despite heavy counterattacks, suffering twenty-one thousand casualties. The Germans by this time had a semi-permanent front line, with very deep dugouts and concrete pillboxes, supported by artillery accurately ranged on no man's land.

The attack was a major success and caused no small panic to German commanders; proving quite clearly to them that well-prepared defences could no longer fend off a well-prepared attack under good conditions. It convinced them that the standard defences of lines of trenches that had served so well up until now was obsolete, and that a more elastic defence system would have to be put in place.

Battle of Polygon Wood

26 September - 3 October - Further advances at Polygon Wood and Broodseinde on the southwestern edge of the salient accounted for another two thousand yards and thirty thousand Allied casualties. The British line was now overlooked by the Passchendaele ridge, which therefore became an important objective and made the capture of the high ground even more of an imperative.

October - November 1917

Battle of Broodseinde

The New Zealand Division (part of II Anzac Corps) made its first attack on 4 October 1917. Its role was to provide flanking cover for an Australian assault on the Broodseinde Ridge. The New Zealanders’ objective was Gravenstafel Spur, the first of two spurs from the main ridge at Passchendaele (the other was Bellevue Spur). Once again artillery played a big part in the success of the attack, which was made by 1st and 4th brigades.

The bombardment, which began at 6 a.m., caught many Germans in the front lines, causing heavy casualties and disrupting the defence. Although the going was difficult – ‘The mud is a worse enemy than the German,’ divisional commander Sir Andrew Russell complained – the New Zealand troops advanced 1000 metres to secure the spur and consolidate their position. More than a thousand prisoners were taken, but the attack cost more than 320 New Zealand lives, including that of the former All Black captain Dave Gallaher.

The events of 4 October had a tragic aftermath. The British high command mistakenly concluded that the number of enemy casualties meant enemy resistance was faltering. It resolved to make another push immediately. An attack on 9 October by British and Australian troops was to open the way for II Anzac Corps to capture Passchendaele on the 12th.

Battle of Poelcappelle

An advance on 9 October at Poelkapelle (or Poelcappelle to the British) was a dismal failure for the Allies, with minor advances by exhausted troops forced back by counterattacks.

First Battle of Passchendaele

The First Battle of Passchendaele, on 12 October 1917 began with a further Allied attempt to gain ground around Poelkapelle. The heavy rain again made movement difficult, and artillery could not be brought closer to the front owing to the mud. The Allied troops were fought-out, and morale was suffering. Against the well-prepared German defences, the gains were minimal and there were 13,000 Allied casualties.

On this day there were more than 2,700 New Zealand casualties, of which 45 officers and 800 men were either dead or lying mortally wounded between the lines. In terms of lives lost in a single day, this remains the blackest day in New Zealand’s recorded history.

By this point there had been 100,000 Allied casualties, with only limited gains and no strategic breakthrough.

Second Battle of Passchendaele

26 October - 10 November - At this point two divisions of the Canadian Corps were moved into the line to replace the badly depleted ANZAC forces. After their successes at Vimy Ridge and the Battle of Hill 70, the Canadians were considered to be an élite force and were sent into action in some of the worst conditions of the war.

Upon his arrival, the Canadian Commander-in-Chief General Sir Arthur Currie expressed the view that the cost of the objective would be sixteen thousand casualties. While Currie viewed this figure as inordinately high in relation to the value of the objective, Haig had estimated that the casualties from remaining in place would be worse if this objective was not taken.

The Canadians moved into the line during mid-October, and on 26 October 1917, the Second Battle of Passchendaele began with twenty thousand men of the Third and Fourth Canadian Divisions advancing up the hills of the salient. It cost the Allies twelve thousand casualties for a gain of a few hundred yards.

Reinforced with the addition of two British divisions, a second offensive on 30 October resulted in the capture of the town in heavy rains. For the next five days the force held the town in the face of repeated German shelling and counterattacks, and by the time a second group of reinforcements arrived on 6 November, four-fifths of the infantrymen in two Canadian divisions had been lost.

Their replacements were the First and Second Canadian Divisions. German troops still ringed the area, so a limited attack on the 6th by the remaining troops of the Third Division allowed the First Division to make major advances and gain strong points throughout the area.

One such action on the First Division front was at Hill 52; the Tenth Battalion, CEF were called out of reserve to assist an attack on Hill 52, part of the same low rise where Passchendaele was situated. The Battalion was not scheduled to attack, but the Commanding Officer of the Tenth had wisely prepared his soldiers as if they would be making the main assault – a decision that paid dividends when the unit was called out of reserve. On 10 November 1917, the Tenth Battalion took the feature with light casualties.

A further attack by the Second Division the same day pushed the Germans from the slopes to the east of the town. The high ground was now firmly under Allied control.

Aftermath

Passchendaele could be regarded, by some, as a re-play of the Somme; an offensive mounted by the British and French Forces designed to make large gains in terms of territory. However, given the importance of the Ypres salient — the campaign to clear the high ground east and south of the much battered city was important, but once it began, it had to be completed.

After months of fighting, the Allies had crawled forward 5 miles (8 kilometres) but had gained the high ground that dominated the salient. The price had been almost half a million men of which around 140,000 had been killed. Also reminiscent of the Somme were the colossal artillery barrages which failed to destroy German defenses, but which did inflict enormous losses that the Germans couldn't afford. Ultimately, as a battle of attrition, that captured some important assets, the campaign can be said to be a lean Allied victory.

Because of the Third Battle of Ypres there were insufficient reserves available to exploit the Allied success at the Battle of Cambrai, the first breakthrough by massed tanks, that restored somewhat the shaken confidence of the British government in the final victory. The politicians were reluctant however to fully replace the manpower losses, for fear the new troops would be sacrificed also. This made the British Army vulnerable to a German attack.

The major German offensive of 1918, Operation Michael, began on 21 March 1918, and a supporting operation which became the Battle of the Lys, began on 9 April. This regained almost all of the ground taken by the Allies at Passchendaele, with the Germans advancing about 6 miles (9.7 km). This meant that every inch of ground (that had taken 450,000 casualties and 5 months to take) gained in the offensive was lost to the Germans, in a space of about three days, further proving the point of many historians that the Ypres salient was "not the most strategically significant area on which to wage a major campaign". However, the Germans were also easily pushed away from Ypres once more in the final and fifth battle around the city in September and October of 1918.
These battles, and those British Empire soldiers who gave their lives, are commemorated at the Menin Gate Memorial in Ypres, the Tyne Cot Cemetery and Memorial to the Missing, the largest Commonwealth War Graves Commission cemetery in the world with nearly 12,000 graves.

More than any other battle, Passchendaele has come to symbolise the horrific nature of the great battles of the First World War. In terms of killed, wounded and missing, the Germans lost approximately 260,000 men, while the British Empire forces lost about 300,000, including approximately 36,500 Australians, 3,596 New Zealanders and 16,000 Canadians — the latter of which were lost in the intense final assault between 26 October and 10 November; 90,000 British and Dominion bodies were never identified, and 42,000 never recovered. Aerial photography showed 1,000,000 shell holes in 1 square mile (2.56 km²).

Also See - World War I soldier identified as Private George Richard Storey

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